From Spam to Shutdown: Ransomware’s Social Engineering Path into OT
About This Session
Ransomware campaigns are evolving. Attackers increasingly rely on social engineering and the misuse of remote management tools to gain trusted access, bypassing traditional defenses. Instead of exploiting vulnerabilities, adversaries overwhelm employees with spam or fraudulent calls, persuading them to install or approve remote access software. From this initial foothold in IT, they move laterally with credential theft and legitimate administration tools, preparing the ground for ransomware deployment.
For industrial organizations, the risk is amplified by the growing convergence of IT and OT networks. Dual-use engineering laptops, jump servers, and weak segmentation provide adversaries with potential pathways from corporate systems into operational environments. What begins as a nuisance in IT can quickly escalate into production downtime or disruption of critical services.
This session will present a case study of ransomware operators abusing remote management tools to demonstrate how IT intrusions can cascade into OT impact. We will also show how threat intelligence can uncover early warning signs—spam floods, anomalous RMM usage, or low-severity alerts—and map them against MITRE ATT&CK for ICS to guide risk-based defenses.
Key Takeaways:
How ransomware groups are shifting from exploits to social engineering and RMM abuse
Why IT compromises represent growing risks to OT environments
How to use threat intelligence to connect weak IT signals into early OT warnings
Practical defenses: limiting RMM tools, tightening segmentation, and intelligence-led monitoring
For industrial organizations, the risk is amplified by the growing convergence of IT and OT networks. Dual-use engineering laptops, jump servers, and weak segmentation provide adversaries with potential pathways from corporate systems into operational environments. What begins as a nuisance in IT can quickly escalate into production downtime or disruption of critical services.
This session will present a case study of ransomware operators abusing remote management tools to demonstrate how IT intrusions can cascade into OT impact. We will also show how threat intelligence can uncover early warning signs—spam floods, anomalous RMM usage, or low-severity alerts—and map them against MITRE ATT&CK for ICS to guide risk-based defenses.
Key Takeaways:
How ransomware groups are shifting from exploits to social engineering and RMM abuse
Why IT compromises represent growing risks to OT environments
How to use threat intelligence to connect weak IT signals into early OT warnings
Practical defenses: limiting RMM tools, tightening segmentation, and intelligence-led monitoring
Speaker
Sanjay Kumar
Threat Intelligence Manager - Landis+Gyr
Sanjay Kumar is a Threat Intelligence Manager at Landis+Gyr and a PhD researcher in Cybersecurity and Networking at the University of Jyväskylä Finland, specializing in hybrid machine learning–based threat detection. He has over a decade of global experience in threat intelligence, detection engineering, and adversary tracking, having worked at several international organizations, and he currently serves as Chair of IEEE Finland Young Professionals. Sanjay is an active speaker at international cybersecurity conferences and has earned numerous awards recognizing his contributions to the field.
