When the power grid is under physical attack and the network is under cyberattack at the same moment, continuity stops being a tabletop exercise. This vendor-neutral, practitioner session draws on three years directing the municipal enterprise responsible for a capital city's critical-infrastructure networks, operational telemetry, alarms, command-and-control, and essential-service continuity through sustained, simultaneous cyber and kinetic attack - directly relevant to energy, water, utility, and transportation operators preparing for hybrid threats.

It covers real operational decisions and the lessons that proved decisive: telling a kinetic-caused outage apart from a cyberattack in real time (so response isn't wasted on the wrong failure mode); prioritizing scarce resources when not every system can be protected; treating redundancy - backup power, diverse routing, alternative communications such as TETRA and LoRaWAN, distributed workloads - as a governance and budget decision rather than an engineering afterthought; sustaining human-capital and command continuity when staff are mobilized or displaced; and running essential services in deliberate "degraded mode." Sensitive operational details are generalized.

What attendees will learn:
- How to distinguish, operationally, whether a control-system or telemetry outage is cyber or physical - and why that determination changes the response.
- A practical model for prioritizing critical OT and essential services when you cannot protect everything at once.
- Concrete redundancy and degraded-mode patterns that sustained critical city services through combined attack.
- How to architect human-capital and command-structure continuity for critical-infrastructure operations under sustained crisis.
- Transferable resilience principles US utility and critical-infrastructure operators can apply to hybrid-threat preparedness.