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>Critical Infrastructure >Trump Declares National Emergency Over Foreign Threats to US Power Grid

Trump Declares National Emergency Over Foreign Threats to US Power Grid

President Donald Trump has declared a national emergency over security risks associated with foreign-produced equipment used in the United States bulk-power system, citing the potential for digital backdoors, malicious remote access, sabotage, and supply chain disruption.

Executive Order 14420, issued Wednesday, gives the Department of Energy broad authority to prohibit the acquisition, importation, transfer, or installation of foreign-produced power system equipment when it is linked to a covered foreign entity and deemed to pose an unacceptable security risk.

The restrictions extend beyond physical equipment to critical components, software, firmware, digital and maintenance services, update mechanisms, and remote-access capabilities.

The order attributes the heightened threat to the rapid growth of data centers, artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, and defense production, which has increased the country’s dependence on abundant and reliable electricity while magnifying the potential consequences of an attack or supply disruption.

According to the White House, minimal restrictions on foreign-produced grid equipment could allow foreign entities to introduce and exploit vulnerabilities, including built-in backdoors providing remote access. Dependence on overseas suppliers also creates the risk that critical equipment could become unavailable due to trade disruptions or other supply chain shocks.

Equipment covered by the order includes transformers, generators, turbines, grid-connected inverters, battery energy storage systems, protective relays, circuit breakers, and industrial control systems such as remote terminal units, programmable logic controllers, intelligent electronic devices, distributed control systems, and safety instrumented systems.

The order applies to the bulk-power system, including transmission infrastructure rated at 69 kilovolts or higher, but excludes facilities used for local electricity distribution.

New transactions may be blocked if the Energy Department determines that the equipment was designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by individuals or organizations controlled by or subject to the jurisdiction of a covered foreign entity.

Transactions can be prohibited when they pose an undue risk of sabotage, subversion, unauthorized access, malicious remote action, or supply disruption. Restrictions can also be imposed when equipment presents the risk of catastrophic effects on US critical infrastructure or the economy.

The order does not name any country or company. Covered foreign entities include countries subject to specified US arms embargoes or sanctions, along with other entities determined to be engaged in conduct detrimental to US national security or foreign policy.

However, the order’s structure closely mirrors a 2020 Trump administration directive that led to an Energy Department prohibition targeting certain equipment connected to China. That prohibition was later revoked while the Biden administration reviewed the government’s approach to power grid supply chain security.

The renewed action comes amid longstanding concerns about China’s access to US critical infrastructure. While much of the recent attention has focused on state-sponsored threat groups such as Volt Typhoon infiltrating power and other critical infrastructure networks, the executive order addresses a different layer of the threat: vulnerabilities or backdoors introduced before equipment is deployed.

Significantly, the order also applies to foreign-manufactured or foreign-operated equipment already installed in US power infrastructure. The Energy secretary can require operators to identify, isolate, monitor, secure, disconnect, replace, or remove equipment determined to pose a threat.

Before directing isolation, removal, or replacement, officials must consider grid reliability and safety, the availability of secure alternatives, and continuity of essential services. Compliance can be phased to avoid disrupting power delivery.

The Energy Department has 120 days to issue implementing rules as needed and must identify foreign-linked equipment that presents an unacceptable risk. It will also develop recommendations for inventorying, monitoring, isolating, or replacing suspect technology.

The department may establish a list of prequalified equipment and vendors, although it would retain the authority to restrict products or suppliers that were previously approved.

In addition, the order directs the Energy Department to recommend changes to federal procurement rules within 180 days. The revisions are expected to incorporate national security considerations into energy infrastructure purchases and prioritize US-manufactured equipment.

The order does not impose an immediate blanket ban on all foreign-made grid technology. Its practical impact, including which countries, vendors, and products will be targeted, will become clearer as the Energy Department develops its implementing rules.